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Jan Halák 
 
This chapter presents an account of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the body schema 
as an operative intentionality that is not only opposed to, but also complexly 
intermingled with, the representation-like grasp of the world and one’s own body, or the 
body image. The chapter reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s position primarily based on his 
preparatory notes for his 1953 lecture ‘The Sensible World and the World of 
Expression’. Here, Merleau-Ponty elaborates his earlier efforts to show that the body 
schema is a perceptual ground against which the perceived world stands out as a 
complex of perceptual figures. The chapter clarifies how Merleau-Ponty’s renewed 
interpretation of the figure-ground structure makes it possible for him to describe the 
relationship between body schema and perceptual (body) image as a strictly systematic 
phenomenon. Subsequently, the chapter shows how Merleau-Ponty understands apraxia, 
sleep, and perceptual orientation as examples of dedifferentiation and subtler 
differentiation of the body-schematic system. The last section clarifies how such body-
schematic differentiating processes give rise to relatively independent superstructures of 
vision and symbolic cognition which constitute our body image. It, moreover, explains 
how, according to Merleau-Ponty, the cognitive superstructures always need to be 
supported by praxic operative intentionality to maintain their full sense, even though, in 
some cases, they have the power to compensate for praxic deficiencies. 
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3.1 Introduction: the concept of body schema in 
Merleau-Ponty’s works 
1The efforts to maintain a distinction between body image and body 
schema seem to be essentially driven by the objective to defend an 
operative intentionality (knowing how) from those accounts that view it 
as reducible to a representational intentionality (knowing what).2 In this 
respect, Merleau-Ponty’s works prefigure the more recent enactivist 
approaches and, interestingly, they are very often similarly defensive. 
Merleau-Ponty lengthily disproves Descartes’, Kant’s, or Sartre’s 
representationalist accounts and the evidence he presents has frequently 
the negative form of reasons for which these accounts are not correct. 
However, once the originality of operative intentionality has been 
acknowledged and enough attention is being paid to how it differs from a 
representational intentionality, we are faced with a question of higher 
order. We need to take into account the various cases in which an explicit 
awareness of perceptual figures does not only result from, but also 
impacts back on, the body-schematic activity. For example, an explicit 
perceptual awareness of one’s body has been shown to hinder one’s motor 
performance. At the same time, it can compensate for a corporeal 
 
1 Work on this chapter was supported by the project ‘Philosophical study of bodily 
intentionality in an interdisciplinary context’ (2018–2021), Faculty of Arts, Palacký 
University Olomouc, reg. no. FPVC2018/06. 
2 The term ‘operative intentionality’ was coined by Merleau-Ponty based on Husserl’s 
and Fink’s works and should be understood in contrast to a representational ‘act 
intentionality’ related to our reflective awareness and volitional decisions (cf., for 
example, Merleau-Ponty, 2012, pp. lxxxii, 441; 1968a, pp. 238–239, 244). 
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impairment. These phenomena call for an explanation of how the 
operative intentionality of our body schema is not only opposed to, but 
also complexly intermingled with, the representation-like grasp of one’s 
own body, or the body image, and of the world in general. Taking up this 
question, my aim in this chapter is twofold—to present key aspects of 
Merleau-Ponty’s works on body schema that go beyond the ‘defensive’ 
approach, and to clarify how they contribute to our understanding of the 
relationship between body schema and body image. 
Before examining the notion of body schema, I note that Merleau-
Ponty does not use any technical term corresponding to what could be 
translated into English as ‘body image’3. As I will explain in Section 3.3, 
Merleau-Ponty even has philosophical reasons for privileging the notion 
of schema over the notion of image. Nevertheless, he occasionally 
discusses some of the experiences targeted by the concept of body image. 
In particular, he writes about the consciousness of one’s body as it is 
mediated by visual perception and conceptual articulation based on 
linguistic symbolic systems. More importantly, however, Merleau-Ponty 
systematically relates his general interpretation of perceptual and 
linguistic experiences to the body-schematic operative intentionality. 
Thus, on the one hand, it is essential not to approach Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy with a distinction between body schema and body image 
operated in advance (cf. Saint-Aubert, 2013, p. 43). This would obfuscate 
 
3 When Merleau-Ponty interprets the works of Lhermitte (1939) or Schilder (1935) who 
employ the formulations l’image de notre corps and the image of the body, respectively, 
he consistently employs the term schéma corporel (cf. Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, p. 117; 
2011, pp. 126–162; 2012, p. 101 n5; cf. also Landes, 2012, p. xlix; Gallagher & 
Meltzoff, 1996, p. 217; Saint-Aubert, 2013, pp. 40–41). 
his subtle analyses of how perceptual and linguistic experiences arise 
from our body-schematic praxis. On the other hand, we can gain insights 
into the relationship between body image and body schema as they are 
understood today, by extending Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the 
relationship between the explicit perceptual and linguistic-conceptual 
experiences and the body-schematic operative intentionality. My ambition 
in this chapter is to contribute to an elaboration of this second point. 
Regarding the concept of body schema (schéma corporel) in 
Merleau-Ponty, most attention has been dedicated to Phenomenology of 
Perception (see, for example, Casey, 1984; Dillon, 1987; Carman, 1999; 
Gallagher, 1986; Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1996; Morris, 1999; 2004, pp. 
36–52). However, as David Morris points out (2004, p. 35), much of 
Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of the concept in the Phenomenology of 
Perception is implicit. Considerable attention has also been dedicated to 
Merleau-Ponty’s lectures from the Sorbonne (1964c; 2010b; cf., for 
example, Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1996; Lymer, 2011; Whitney, 2012; 
2018). Nevertheless, these lectures were primarily designed to provide 
students with an overview of recent psychological theories and to teach 
them the material needed for exams. Merleau-Ponty’s main objective here 
was not to present his own philosophical position. Moreover, the text we 
have at our disposition consists of students’ notes approved by Merleau-
Ponty for publication, not of Merleau-Ponty’s original writing (cf. Welsh, 
2010, pp. ix–x). 
Although their scope was limited, these resources were the most 
important until recently. Some relevant additions to them were Merleau-
Ponty’s texts written for his candidacy for a Collège de France 
professorship (1964b; 2000) and several summaries of the lectures from 
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this institution (1970). Beyond that, the concept of body schema appears 
in some of the lecture notes published since the late 1990s. It seems to 
have marginally influenced the lectures on ‘The Problem of Passivity’ 
(2010a; delivered in 1954–1955) and, to a much greater extent, the third 
year of Merleau-Ponty’s lectures on ‘Nature’ (2003, pp. 201–283; 
delivered in 1959–1960). Here, Merleau-Ponty takes up his earlier works 
on the body schema in order to elaborate a description of the libidinal 
nature of the body. The concept is also mentioned several times in both 
the published and unpublished working texts for the Visible and the 
Invisible (1958; 1959; 1968a; cf. also Saint-Aubert’s overview, 2013, pp. 
70–74). Merleau-Ponty’s last writings show that his early works allowed 
him to use the concept of body schema as a self-explanatory tool suitable 
for a better understanding of other problems. 
Nevertheless, the richest source regarding Merleau-Ponty’s 
discussion of the body schema is the recent edition of his preparatory 
notes for his first Collège de France course (Merleau-Ponty, 2011, 
delivered in 1953)4 in combination with Merleau-Ponty’s summary of the 
course (1970, pp. 3–11). Of a total of 14 lessons of this course, the last 
five are dedicated to an extensive, explicit discussion of the body schema 
(see 2011, pp. 126–162, 199–211). Merleau-Ponty builds here on his 
reading of Schilder’s expanded English version (1935) of an earlier work. 
The principal sources from the Phenomenology of Perception remain in 
the background (e.g., Head & Holmes, 1911–12; Lhermitte, 1939; 
 
4 This chapter was completed before an official English translation of the course became 
available (Merleau-Ponty, 2020). Thus, all quotations from the course are my 
translations. 
Schilder, 1923), while other sources are added, sometimes via Schilder 
(e.g., de Ajuriaguerra & Hécaen, 1949; 1952; Gerstmann, 1927; Lange, 
1930; 1933; Mayer-Gross, 1935; 1936; cf. the bibliography of the course, 
Merleau-Ponty, 2011, pp. 213–217). 
The text published in 2011 contains Merleau-Ponty’s preparatory 
notes for his teaching, not the courses actually delivered. Since the notes 
are fragmentary, frequently allusive, and not always conclusive, this text 
has so far received considerably less attention from commentators than 
other Merleau-Ponty’s works dealing with the body schema (see, for 
example, Saint-Aubert, 2011; 2013; Halák, 2016; Kristensen, 2019). 
Focusing on the principal question of how the body schema is related to 
intentional experiences referred to as body image, my goal in this chapter 
is to reconstruct Merleau-Ponty’s position in the lecture of 1953 while 
supporting it with other sources mentioned above. I first summarize what 
Merleau-Ponty tells us about the original phenomenality of the body 
schema and how he links it to the figure-ground structural relationship 
introduced by Gestalt psychology. Subsequently, I discuss Merleau-
Ponty’s interpretation of the dynamic differentiation of the body schema 
as a ground of action and perception. This exposition opens the way for 
Section 3.5, in which I aim to clarify how the body-schematic operative 
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3.2 The body schema as the background of 
perceptual figures 
Very much in the spirit of recent discussions on the difference between 
body schema and body image, Merleau-Ponty explicitly claims that the 
body schema ‘is not perceived’ (2011, p. 143). More precisely, he 
explains that it usually ‘does not need to be expressly perceived’ (p. 142; 
my emphasis). It is a ‘precognitive function’ that ‘precedes [avant] 
explicit perception’ (p. 143; original emphasis); it ‘adjust[s] my body to 
objects entirely below the threshold of [en deçà de] explicit perception of 
the body or of the objects’ (2000, p. 18; cf. 1964b, p. 5 and 2012, p. 141). 
However, the fact that the body schema does not need to be perceived 
does not mean, for Merleau-Ponty, that it generally belongs to the domain 
of the ‘non-conscious’, as in Shaun Gallagher’s framework (cf., for 
example, Gallagher, 2005, pp. 55–56, or Gallagher & Cole, 1995, p. 385). 
Merleau-Ponty crucially points out that since the variations of the 
body schema, such as the changes of muscular tonus, arouse variations of 
the perceived space, ‘the body schema is also a certain structure of the 
perceived world, and the latter has its roots in the former’ (2011, p. 144; 
my emphasis; cf., for example, 2012, pp. 145, n115; 213). In other words, 
the body schema is the ‘relatively imperceived’ background or ground 
(fond) of the perceptual figures targeted by our actions (1970, p. 4; cf., in 
particular, 2011, pp. 138–139). The body schema equips us with an 
‘implicit notion of the relation between our body and things’ (1964b, p. 5; 
my emphasis). Our motor projects, and the perceived objects targeted by 
them, stand out as explicit figures against this implicit background (2011, 
p. 131; 2012, p. 105). Structurally, the body schema is a figure (Gestalt, 
totality superior to the sum of its parts), but it cannot be conceived of only 
in terms of explicitly perceived or intellectually conceived figures, for 
figures themselves ‘can neither be conceived nor exist at all without 
horizons’ or backgrounds (p. 103). 
The lecture notes from 1953 bring important clarifications. As a 
ground, the body schema is ‘not merely confused perception’ or a 
‘context’ of upcoming perceptions (Merleau-Ponty, 2011, pp. 142, 141). 
For Merleau-Ponty, there is a structural difference, ‘a difference of 
order’, between an explicit figure and an implicit background (p. 141). 
The body schema is that through which the world is present to our action 
(p. 141), rather than contents inside the world—it is ‘the mediator of here-
there relation’ (p. 142). One’s bodily engagement in and toward the world 
creates a divergence (écart) between the perceiving and the perceived 
(1968a, p. 197) and thereby distributes perceptual values between 
‘indifferent backgrounds’ and ‘privileged figures’, making the latter stand 
out against the former. For this reason, each figure ‘appears perspectivally 
against the double horizon of external space and bodily space’, which 
makes the body schema ‘the always implied third term of the figure–
background structure’ (2012, p. 103). 
The body schema is thus the background, in relation to which all 
the particular perceptual contents are organized (cf. 2011, p. 141). The 
consciousness we have of it is normally a consciousness of a divergence 
from this background, a consciousness Merleau-Ponty calls ‘indirect’ (cf. 
p. 139). Certainly, the background can be perceived as a figure by means 
of a perceptual operation of a superior order such as a philosophical 
reflection (p. 141). However, such an operation is typically not required 
for the body schema to be present on the background and available for us. 
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If, for example, a person needs to actively explore one part of his or her 
body with the help of other parts to identify its spatial position, this 
condition signals an impairment on the level of the body schema. 
Merleau-Ponty describes the ‘preparatory movements’ of Gelb’s and 
Goldstein’s patient Schneider precisely as attempts to access his body in 
terms of perceptual figures and to compensate the disintegration of his 
body as a perceptual ground (2012, p. 110). 
By consequence, Merleau-Ponty thinks that to situate the body 
schema with regard to what we are consciously aware of ultimately 
‘requires a revision of our notion of consciousness’ (2011, p. 143). Even 
more radically, Merleau-Ponty suggests that we ‘abandon’ the notion of 
consciousness altogether and ‘replace’ it by a description of a mutual 
‘expression’ between the body schema (background) and the perceived 
world (figure) (pp. 51, 53). 
Merleau-Ponty elaborates this idea by describing how the body 
schema ‘immediately’ gives us positions, distances, or the elapsed 
duration of time as ‘charged’ with the practical value they have for us. 
Comparable to a ‘taximeter’ on which the distance travelled is presented 
as already transformed into the cost of the journey, the body schema 
presents spatiotemporal contents already ‘in terms of I can’ (2010a, p. 
242).5 In the lecture of 1954–1955, Merleau-Ponty even speaks more 
broadly of a ‘practical schema’ that (re-)establishes the referential norms 
of our life ‘by distributing valences to all that is presented’ according to 
what is inscribed in it from our personal and interpersonal history (2010a, 
 
5 Merleau-Ponty is alluding here to Head & Holmes (1911–1912, p. 187) (cf. Merleau-
Ponty, 2011, pp. 136, 196, 200; 2012, pp. 140–143). 
p. 169, n10). This extension is anticipated in the 1953 lecture, where 
Merleau-Ponty explains that the perceptual consciousness should be 
conceived of ‘as essentially projective’ in the Freudian sense, for ‘we see 
on things what is manifestly an expression of the subject’ (2011, p. 176; 
original emphasis). Between the body-schematic ground and the figures 
of the sensible world, there is therefore an ‘expressive relation’ (p. 63), 
for the world ‘indicates’ what is required from our body in terms of our 
movement, posture, and attitude, while inversely the body opens a field 
for something to be perceived and ‘completes the given’ by appropriately 
adapting itself to it (p. 80). Perception, Merleau-Ponty concludes on these 
grounds, ‘is already expression’ (1970, p. 6; similarly, 2011, p. 176). 
As the background which is ‘expressed’ by experienced figures, 
the body schema is precisely ‘invisible’ in the sense of the late Merleau-
Ponty’s notion (1968a). Importantly, Merleau-Ponty explains that the 
concepts of visible and invisible ‘are not contradictory’ and one should 
employ his concept of the ‘invisible’ as one speaks of the ‘immobile’ 
(1964a, p. 21)—the invisible in Merleau-Ponty’s sense ‘is not foreign’ to 
the domain of visibility; it is rather ‘the limit or degree zero of visibility, 
the opening of a dimension of the visible’ (p. 21). 
As applied to the body, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of invisible 
combines the Gestalt-psychological idea of perceptual norm and 
Husserl’s interpretation of the body as the ‘point-zero’ of orientation (see 
Husserl, 1989, pp. 165–166). All the explicit experiences I have of my 
body and of the objects ‘oscillate around norms’ or reference levels that 
‘are never given’ as such but are univocally circumscribed by the way in 
which those experiences differentiate one from another, and all from the 
level itself (Merleau-Ponty 2011, pp. 178–179). Thus, the ‘invisible’ body 
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schema is not the contrary of what we are conscious of, but precisely the 
referential level, the ‘degree zero’ in relation to which the figures we are 
conscious of acquire their maximum of determinacy. 
Merleau-Ponty’s use of the figure-on-a-ground conceptual 
framework brings our attention to the fact that although we are not 
conscious of it, the body schema is a necessary structural dimension of 
what we are consciously aware of. Although we do not perceive it, we 
perceive according to it and in relation to it. It is precisely for this reason 
that Merleau-Ponty asserts that the body schema is ‘never absent in [an] 
awakened consciousness’ (2011, p. 142). In other words, Merleau-Ponty 
provides reasons for supporting the view that the relationship between the 
implicit body-schematic background and the explicit figures (including all 
body images) should be understood as systematic. The body schema is not 
related to perceptual figures in an arbitrary way; its presence does not 
unilaterally depend on situations, and it is not just a result of factual 
processes. A perception, be it a perception of one’s own body (‘body 
image percept’), is always a figure on a (back)ground, and as such, it is a 
modality of the indivisible figure-on-a-ground system. 
In this respect, Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the body schema 
marks a significant difference from Shaun Gallagher’s approach, although 
both approaches could be qualified as non-representationalist. Gallagher 
explains that, inasmuch as the body schema is essentially a corporeal 
automatism, it generally remains in the domain of the ‘non-conscious’ 
(e.g., 2005, p. 38). Beyond that, he adds that his distinction between body 
schema and body image ‘cuts across’ the distinction of conscious–non-
conscious (e.g., p. 18) and that, correspondingly, some aspects of the body 
schema may become conscious (e.g., p. 38). Interestingly, Gallagher 
himself adopts the idea that the body schema should be conceived of as a 
background of perceptual figures.6 However, considering his definition of 
the body schema as something that is not related to the conscious domain 
in a systematic way, the ‘ground’ Gallagher refers to would not have a 
systematical relationship to the perceptual figures either. Although 
Gallagher himself points to ‘reciprocal interactions’ between body 
schema and body image (e.g., p. 35), in his framework, these relationships 
are described as situational. Merleau-Ponty’s view is, on the contrary, 
that the background of perceptual figures is systematically shaping all that 
is phenomenal for us, and thus constitutes a structural part of the 
consciousness itself. In the Merleau-Pontyan framework, the body 
schema therefore cannot be called ‘non-conscious’ in the sense of 
something belonging to a domain that is distinct from what we are 
conscious of.7 
In the following sections, I will explain how Merleau-Ponty 
maintains, but also modifies, this position by taking into consideration 
 
6 See Gallagher (2005, p. 36; 2017, p. 191; see also Chapter 6), referring to Goldstein & 
Scheerer (1964). Merleau-Ponty did not read the latter text, but his interpretations of 
Goldstein’s earlier works (see, in particular, Merleau-Ponty, 2012, pp. 105–140) 
emphasize an interdependence between the two dimensions of the figure-on-a-ground, 
much like Goldstein and Scheerer later did (e.g. 1964, p. 8). 
7 Commentators familiar with Merleau-Ponty’s works sometimes perceive Gallagher’s 
emphasis on strictly distinguishing body image from body schema as an approach ill-
equipped for positively qualifying their relations (see, for example, Saint-Aubert, 2013, 
pp. 52, 58; Kristensen, 2019, pp. 25, 32–33). The adoption of the figure-on-a-ground 
model might alleviate this difficulty. However, Merleau-Ponty’s considerations indicate 
that this may require us to conceive of the schema–image relationship as systematical, 
not situational. 
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different processes through which the body schema is transformed into an 
acquisition, an object of perception, and thus ceases to be just its 
background. 
 
3.3 The unity of the body schema as a task-oriented 
system 
Since Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty has insisted on the 
originality of the notion of schema and clarifies its meaning by providing 
a series of negative, contrasting definitions. I will now discuss two groups 
of these definitions, in which Merleau-Ponty argues against understanding 
the body schema as a pre-established structure and as a physiological 
mechanism. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that body schema cannot be conceived of in 
terms of bottom-up processes—it is not a result, or a habitual residue of 
factually occurring sensations or stimuli (see 2000, p. 18; 2012, pp. 101–
102). As a schema, it ‘distributes meaning’ to individual sensations in a 
top-down fashion, depending on its global unity.8 Any particular 
sensations of one’s body are only perceived depending on a ‘central 
distribution’ (2011, p. 138). This becomes particularly evident in some 
pathological cases, such as autotopagnosia, phantom limb, and allesthesia 
(allochiria). 
However, the unity of the body schema is not a fixed structure. It 
always remains ‘open and indefinite’ (2012, p. 242; cf. 2011, pp. 139, 
142). More precisely, it is organized and specified in relation to 
 
8 Cf. Merleau-Ponty (2011, p. 133; cf. 1964b, p. 5; 2000, p. 18; 2010b, p. 24). 
situational praxic tasks, actual or possible (p. 102). Correspondingly, the 
unity of the body schema is equivalent to its capacity for a synergic action 
oriented toward these tasks (p. 152).9 Instead of being merely a pre-
established structure, the body schema must therefore be conceived of as 
a unity of praxis dynamically adapting to tasks.10 
Correspondingly, our consciousness of our body is ‘closely 
connected to what we do’ (2011, p. 131; original emphasis). Thus, to 
‘have a body’ or a bodily organ is to know where to find the praxic 
powers to carry out an action, and to experience a ‘coincidence’ 
(Deckung, as Husserl puts it) between certain aspects of the world as we 
act upon them, and the body as a starting point for this initiative (pp. 150, 
136). When this unity of action is compromised due to an unusual 
position of the limbs or a pathology, the subject does not experience the 
body as belonging to him or her, despite the body being objectively 
present and physiologically available (pp. 135, 150; cf. also below the 
discussion on Japanese illusion). 
In sum, the body schema is a ‘form’ (Gestalt) organizing its 
spatiotemporal environment, but since it is dynamically organized in 
reference to praxic tasks, it is a form that is content-dependent (2011, p. 
104). In other words, the unity of the body schema is centred on the 
perceptual figures as the targets of its praxis, but this makes these figures 
play a role in how the body schema is itself organized. As I will explain 
in more detail below, this relationship has fundamental importance for our 
 
9 Cf., in particular, Merleau-Ponty (2012, pp. 211–212, 243, 330). 
10 See Merleau-Ponty (2011, pp. 138–139, 140–144), interpreting Schilder (1935, pp. 
75–81). 
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understanding of how the body schema can be structured by a body 
image. 
For now, it is important to clarify how Merleau-Ponty furthermore 
explains that the body schema is neither a mechanism (2000, p. 18) nor an 
idea, an ‘object of knowledge’ (2011, p. 140). On the one hand, the body 
schema is a ‘non-ideal totality’ (p. 134); it is ‘concrete’, perceptible; it 
does not need to be ‘interpreted’ in order to be understood (p. 133). 
Unlike the unity of an idea, the unity of the body schema is a ‘pre-logical 
unity’ (2012, p. 241), an open unity of a ‘coexistence’ or ‘mutual 
implication’ of the bodily organs acting in synergy (2011, pp. 140, 133). 
To have a body schema thus means to have ‘a power to vary certain 
principle without an explicit knowledge of this principle’ (p. 204). On the 
other hand, one’s body is neither perceived nor moved as an object. The 
perceptual ‘gaps’ involved in my perception of my body are ‘overarched’ 
by the global unity of the body schema, and the body is therefore not 
‘deployed in front of me’ as an object ( pp. 128–129, 132). Similarly, I do 
not move my body instrumentally as I move objects, because I am not 
aware of the means that I am using in order to attain a praxic goal, such as 
which physical parts of my body are involved (p. 133). 
With respect to the more recent debates on the body schema as a 
‘motor program’ providing ‘physiological information’ (e.g., Gallagher & 
Cole, 1995, p. 369), or even a ‘sensori-motor machinery’ (e.g., Paillard, 
1999, p. 212), it is interesting to see how Merleau-Ponty more precisely 
situates the body schema in relation to the body as a physiological entity. 
The body-schematic functioning can be viewed as situated at the limits of 
what falls within my personal control—it is ‘happening’ as a subpersonal 
‘performance’ or ‘process’, as Gallagher writes (2005, pp. 29, 32, 17). 
Although Merleau-Ponty himself speaks of the body as an anonymous 
organism (e.g., 2012, p. 86), he also claims that his analysis of perception 
in terms of the body schema demonstrates an ‘existential layer’ of 
perception, which is situated ‘beyond the physiological mechanisms 
which have been studied so far’ (2011, p. 200; original emphasis). 
Similarly, Merleau-Ponty refuses to identify Goldstein’s ‘concrete 
movement’ with a ‘physiological’ event (2012, pp. 124–126), again 
referring to an ‘existential’ dimension of perception (pp. 133–137). Even 
though the body schema could be viewed as a pre-personal automatism, 
Merleau-Ponty points out that it also accommodates personal history and 
that ‘the past of my body is present to it like its future’, since the history 
is ‘enclosed in the I can’ of the body as a ‘polarization of its power’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2010a, p. 195, referring to Schilder, 1935). Moreover, 
Merleau-Ponty notes that he is indifferent to ‘inductive discussions’ 
related to the body schema, such as whether it is principally postural 
(Head) or visual (Schilder) (2011, pp. 210–211; cf. 2012, pp. 115–122). 
In his view, the meaning of a phenomenon cannot be established 
inductively because it involves a (philosophical) interpretation (2011, p. 
211). 
Merleau-Ponty even claims that his philosophical interpretation of 
the body schema as an ‘existential’ function ‘is not subject to a potential 
refutation’ based on empirical evidence (2011, p. 211). This statement can 
be clarified by looking more closely at Merleau-Ponty’s explanation of 
the relationships between physiological conditions of the body and a 
subject’s intentions. 
The ‘existential’ dimension of the body schema, which is 
irreducible to physiological mechanisms, is already evident on Merleau-
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Ponty’s emphasis on the spatiotemporal cohesion of the overall activity of 
the body since, as we have seen, the cohesion does not strictly correlate 
with objective or physiological conditions. Further precisions can be 
given with the help of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of spatial 
orientation—a particular spatial situation can be perceived as both oblique 
or vertical, depending on how the body anchors its (actual or potential) 
activity in the perceived space, be it merely through a passive visual 
observation (2012, pp. 253–265). This happens because the change of the 
perceptual anchoring displaces the perceptual norm serving as the 
reference level for the determination of orientation. 
In the 1953 course notes, Merleau-Ponty elaborates this 
interpretation by taking into consideration other aspects of situation, in 
particular the physiological conditioning of orientation and the active, 
task-oriented mobility of the body (see 2011, pp. 71–73, 76–79, 177–
180). Merleau-Ponty builds here on Schilder’s description of variations of 
muscular tonus, as evidenced on the so-called Kohnstamm’s 
phenomenon.11 A particular muscular tonus establishes a ‘normal resting 
position’ which determines the body schema ‘as norm, zero of divergence 
[écart], level [niveau] or [a] privileged attitude’, in which nothing is 
sensed as a figure (p. 131). Correspondingly, our positions in space are 
experienced as a ‘divergence, anomaly’ from the norm (p. 143; cf. p. 
139). However, the experience of Kohnstamm’s phenomenon furthermore 
shows that the muscular tonus defining the referential norm for explicit 
perceptions is variable, always provisory. More precisely, variations of 
the perceptual norm provide evidence of a ‘divergence’ of spatial 
 
11 Cf. Merleau-Ponty (2011, pp. 131, 139, 142), referring to Schilder (1935, pp. 75–81). 
localization of the body ‘in the direction of the effort’ (p. 142; cf. 1970, p. 
7). As the background of action and the spatiotemporal locality from 
where action proceeds, the body schema is therefore ‘not only 
retrospective: it is prospective’ (2011, p. 142). Consequently, it cannot be 
defined merely as an actual perception of an object—‘it is a project’ (p. 
142; original emphasis).12 For this reason, ‘the body schema and the body 
are situated not where they are objectively, but where we are prepared to 
place them’ (2011, p. 139). In sum, the body-schematic spatial 
localization transcends the objective emplacement of the body and its 
physiology, because the starting positions for our activity, and thus all the 
explicit figures perceived as targets of this activity, are systematically 
shaped by our intentions and projects.13 
A further analysis of the perception of spatial orientation helps 
elaborate this interpretation in even more detail. As Merleau-Ponty 
observes, the perception of movement and rest depends on the vestibular 
system, which is itself one of the physiological aspects of the body 
schema (2011, p. 200). Similarly, Merleau-Ponty notes that a change in 
the labyrinth provokes a variation of the perceived world (p. 144) and can 
thus ‘displace’ the vertical axis (p. 140; 2010a, p. 242). The vertical 
orientation, however, is not given by one sense such as the labyrinth, and 
not even by the sum of the sense data (2011, p. 178), for a disorder of the 
labyrinth, for instance, can be ‘masked’ by visual orientation (pp. 148, 
158). The sense of verticality is neither an interoceptive experience of the 
 
12 On the ‘prospective’ activity of the body, see also Merleau-Ponty (2012, in particular 
pp. 241, 249). 
13 Merleau-Ponty later develops this idea with the help of a psychoanalytical 
understanding of desire. This topic is thoroughly discussed by Saint-Aubert (2013). 
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subject, nor is it given exteroceptively on the basis of what is perceived in 
space (p. 178). Rather, it is given on the basis of the relation established 
between all the experiential dimensions (p. 177). The senses provide the 
vertical axis only ‘as all joined together’, which means that they ‘all 
indicate divergences from the vertical [axis], without being able to 
provide [it]’ in isolation (p. 179). The norm of verticality is not given as a 
particular content of experience; it is ‘invisible’ as the ground toward 
which all the sensed aspects are oriented and around which they 
‘oscillate’ throughout their variations (p. 178; cf. above in Section 3.2). 
Spatial orientation is thus established and maintained only through our 
active ‘engagement’ in the world (montage envers, engagement), without 
which the body becomes enclosed in itself and is reduced to a condition 
of an object (2011, p. 179; 2012, p. 265, n26). 
The body schema is a norm which is open to empirical events, 
precisely a ‘register’ into which these events are continually inscribed 
(1970, p. 7; cf. 2010b, p. 200). However, Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of 
task orientation and spatial orientation shows that this cannot lead us to 
the conclusion that the body schema is ‘a product of development’ 
(Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1996, p. 213; my emphasis; cf. Saint-Aubert 
2013, p. 52). The body schema accommodates both physiological 
(objective, empirical, ontogenetic, pre-personal) and subjective 
(prospective, projective, libidinal, personal history-related) changes of 
situation. Perceptual values are determined not just on the basis of various 
sense data, but because the body and the surrounding space ‘form a 
system’ oscillating around norms that are maintained only through our 
active engagement in the world (2011, pp. 177–178). 
3.4 Differentiations of the body-schematic system 
Perceptual meaning is based on how the figure-ground system concretely 
organizes the relation between the body schema and the perceptual 
environment, which potentially includes perceptions of one’s own body. 
By insisting on the originality of the notion of schema, Merleau-Ponty 
already reinforced the idea that the body schema is itself a system.14 In the 
1953 lectures, Merleau-Ponty elaborates this idea by qualifying the body 
schema as a ‘diacritical system’ (2011, p. 174; my emphasis). As we will 
see, this step enables Merleau-Ponty to further clarify how perceptual 
figures, including the perceptual aspects of our body image, relate to the 
perceptual background of the body schema. 
As stated above, the body schema opens us to divergences (écarts) 
from perceptual levels. This means for Merleau-Ponty that it only gives 
us ‘differences without terms’ (2011, p. 203). Perception, as such, must 
therefore be understood as a ‘diacritical, relative, oppositional system’ 
(1968a, p. 217; cf. 2011, pp. 203–204). Individual ‘cardinal points’ of the 
body-schematic system (2012, p. 328), in particular the active limbs, are 
synergically integrated into one unity; yet inasmuch as they are 
synergized, they also work one in opposition to another, and thus provide 
us with ‘the possibility for discrimination, for the use of the diacritical’ 
(1968a, p. 213; cf. p. 233). 
Merleau-Ponty’s discovery of Saussure in 1947 and his adoption 
of some elements of the structuralist conceptual framework have at least 
two fundamental implications for the interpretation of the body schema 
 
14 See Merleau-Ponty (2012, p. 100; cf., in particular, 1964c, p. 117; 2010b, p. 247; 
2011, p. 133; 2012, pp. 108, 145 n115, 154, 191, 242, 243). 
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and its relation to perceptual and conceptual aspects of body image. On 
the one hand, it helps Merleau-Ponty to identify an ‘interrelation’ between 
‘the conception of neurological pathology in terms of dedifferentiation 
and the Saussurian notion of the diacritical sign’ (1970, p. 23; 1954, p. 
84v). On the other hand, it helps Merleau-Ponty connect the body schema 
and perception as its correlate to language and other cultural diacritical 
systems that similarly only involve ‘differences without positive terms’.15 
Merleau-Ponty thereby formulates a theoretical framework in which the 
flexible diacritical activity of the body schema is geared into 
comparatively more solid diacritical systems of perceptual figures and 
language, which have their specific capacity to provide us with, among 
other things, perceptual and conceptual experiences of our own body. I 
first briefly outline how Merleau-Ponty uses the structuralist framework 
to account for several types of transformations of the body-schematic 
capacity for diacritical action. The second point related to explicit visual 
and linguistic experiences of our own body will be more closely analysed 
in Section 3.5. 
We have seen how the Gestalt-psychological conceptual 
framework already allows Merleau-Ponty to explain how a perceptual 
norm can be shifted, re-established. The fact that the open system of the 
body schema has the capacity to be ‘mobilized’ and ‘specified through 
action’ oriented towards praxic situational tasks (2011, pp. 142, 139) 
means, in short, that the body-schematic ground always accommodates a 
perceptual figure by organizing itself around it. Now, Merleau-Ponty’s 
 
15 For example, Merleau-Ponty (1973, p. 31); quoting Saussure (1959, p. 172); cf. also 
Merleau-Ponty (2011, pp. 117–118, 143, 203–204). 
elaboration of the Gestalt-psychological framework from a structuralist 
perspective helps him to describe this accommodation in a much more 
detailed way. 
An analysis of sleep and compensatory movements in apraxic 
conditions in terms of diacritical operations shows how the body schema 
and perceptual figures are dynamically ‘geared’ one into another 
(engrenage, e.g., 2011, p. 178). Sleep deprives us of our mobility as our 
‘means of articulation of a universe’ into figure-ground structures (1970, 
p. 9)16 and thus leads to a disarticulation of perceptual figures. Similarly, 
the events of falling asleep and waking up must be understood as 
provisional dedifferentiation and subsequent restoration of the structure of 
the body schema as a dynamic diacritical system articulating our 
environment.17 To fall asleep is to ‘return to the inarticulated’ (1970, p. 
47), and inversely, the first movements upon waking up and our effort to 
reconstitute the body ‘as an active totality facing a situation’ (2011, p. 
142) enable us to ‘restore our diacritical and oppositional systems’ based 
on the minimum of contacts with the world maintained during sleep 
(1970, p. 9). 
A condition similar to sleep can be found in Schneider, who uses 
additional exploratory movements to ‘reactivate’ ‘the amorphous mass’ of 
his ‘slumbering’ body schema and to produce an increased articulation of 
perceptual figures (2012, p. 112; 2011, p. 142). Here, the additional 
structuration brought by an increased mobility compensates or 
 
16 Cf. Merleau-Ponty (2011, pp. 151, 164); referring to Mayer (1937). 
17 Cf. Merleau-Ponty (2011, pp. 142, 151, 162–163, 174, 207–208; 1970, pp. 9, 46–48; 
2010a, pp. 145–148). 
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substitutes18 the presence of the body schema on the background as it is 
present in non-pathological perception. The examples of sleep and 
Schneider’s compensatory movements show that between the ‘degrees of 
articulation of our body schema’ (cf. 2011, pp. 151, 163), our movements 
articulating a perceptual target, and the degree of articulation of the 
perceptual figure, there is a correlation and dynamic structural 
interdependence.19 
Merleau-Ponty, moreover, observes that sleep apraxia leads to 
‘sleep aphasia’ or the inability to articulate linguistic meanings (2011, p. 
151). Sleep disintegrates the ‘system of speech’ as the latter is ‘a 
particularly fragile superstructure of the body schema’ (p. 164; cf. 1970, 
p. 9). The free ‘association’ of images, which is typical for sleep and 
dreaming, or the paraphasia of those who are not fully awake, would 
result from a lack of precise speech articulation and, consequently, the 
fact that, for a sleeping subject, the meanings of language signs do not 
adhere to their conventional significations. Merleau-Ponty thus views the 
linguistic system of phonetic and, correspondingly, conceptual 
oppositions as another complex of ‘figures’ that need to be taken up by 
our body schema in order to maintain their meaning. This view also well 
corresponds with other Merleau-Ponty’s observations, according to which 
the body schema is articulated not only in relation to present perceptual 
 
18 In the 1953 lecture, Merleau-Ponty (2011, pp. 94, 142, 158) repeatedly uses 
Goldstein’s term Ersatzleistung. On the compensatory activity, see also Merleau-Ponty 
(1963, p. 40; 2012, p. 80; referring to Goldstein, 1934). 
19 Merleau-Ponty also notes that the body schema always tends to become ‘indistinct’ in 
immobility, even though it never ceases to exist completely (2011, pp. 139, 142; 2012, p. 
110). 
figures, but also by a virtual, imaginary, or verbally presented situation 
(cf. 2012, pp. 110–111). 
Merleau-Ponty’s examples of dynamic processes of 
(de)differentiation of our experience have fundamental importance for our 
understanding of how an element of body image can affect the body 
schema. They more specifically show not only how the articulation of 
perceptual, and even linguistic, figures is a culmination of our body-
schematic mobility, but also how the figures dynamically intervene in the 
organization of the body schema. 
 
3.5 Praxis and gnosis as levels of differentiation 
The interpretation of our body-schematic praxis in terms of diacritical 
activity anticipates Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of its relation to the 
gnosis or ‘contemplative, notional knowledge’ linked to vision and our 
use of symbolic systems such as language (2011, p. 151). 
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty asserts that 
motor experience offers us a way of reaching the world that ‘must be 
recognized as original, and perhaps as originary’ (2012, p. 141). The 
question of originality, however, is a negative one and can be summed up 
as the contention that ‘motor experience is not a particular case of 
knowledge’ (p. 141). Similarly, in the 1953 lectures, Merleau-Ponty 
dedicates most of his efforts to defend the ‘originality of praxis’ or 
mobility (cf. 2011, pp. 151, 154, 158). However, the course notes also 
carefully discuss the more interesting, and the more challenging, question 
of whether our mobility is originary to meaning. The ‘originary notion of 
movement’, Merleau-Ponty claims, ‘exceeds by far’ the idea of a simple 
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‘change of location’—it is one’s ‘gesture’, ‘a means of articulation of a 
universe’ and one’s ‘position among things’ (pp. 151–152). The question 
is, now, whether the knowledge itself is a case of mobility and, if yes, to 
what extent. 
Although Merleau-Ponty often does not provide a clear conclusion 
in his discussions, he clearly explains that his emphasis on the role of 
praxis or mobility should not be understood as a defence of an ‘anti-
intellectualist’ or ‘irrationalist’ philosophical position (2011, p. 52). Far 
from that, he aims to introduce a ‘new type of analysis that applies to the 
intellect [entendement] itself’ (p. 173). Several of his texts from the same 
period clarify that between perception-mobility, on the one hand, and our 
‘experience of truth’ in intellectual understanding and cultural knowledge 
on the other, there is a continuity, but also a qualitative difference (cf., for 
example, 1964b, pp. 6–7; 1973, p. 121). Thus, the ‘theoretical’ attitude 
(theoria) linked to our use of language and other symbolic systems must 
be conceived of as a ‘second-level praxis’ (2011, p. 127), but it is 
impossible to reduce it to the practical-motor performance of the body as 
the agent of perception (p. 199; cf. 1973, p. 129). Such a reduction is not 
what Merleau-Ponty strives for (2011, pp. 54, 199; cf. 2000, p. 29). Now, 
we need to understand more precisely how knowledge (gnosis, theoria) 
transcends, transforms, transfigures, or sublimates perception-mobility 
(praxis).20 
Merleau-Ponty proceeds by confronting contrasting examples. To 
clarify the relationships between praxis (originary mobility), gnosis 
(knowing), and in part also phasis (speaking), he analyses empirical cases 
 
20 Cf., in particular, Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 7; 2011, pp. 55, 65, 162). 
of apraxia and agnosia (eventually aphasia). On Merleau-Ponty’s reading 
of Schilder (1935), apraxia should be described as a condition in which 
the subject ‘knows what’ she is supposed to do (sait ce que, gnosis) and is 
able to describe it in speech (phasis), but the ‘intellectually defined task’ 
is not transformed into the praxic organization required for the 
accomplishment of the task (Merleau-Ponty, 2011, pp. 144, 154–155; cf. 
2012, p. 142). The praxic difficulty is not notional (notionnel), because 
the normal subject herself does not know (ne sait pas) which part of her 
body accomplishes specific parts of the task (2011, p. 155). Although 
there are different types of apraxia, among which only some are 
manifestly associated with gnosic difficulties, they are never simply 
equivalent to a pure incapacity to move a limb or to understand 
(concevoir) the task or to formulate it in speech. Such a condition would 
lead to paralysis or dementia, not to apraxia (p. 155). Crucially, as 
Merleau-Ponty points out, scientists themselves are faced with an 
‘impossibility to absolutely eliminate two [of the] factors to demonstrate 
the causal role of the third’ (p. 153). In other words, it is impossible to 
explain one type of disorder exclusively based on the other (pp. 145, 158; 
cf. 2012, pp. 115–122). 
However, the case of the so-called Japanese illusion, which 
Merleau-Ponty describes as an ‘experimental apraxia’ (2011, p. 127), 
shows more specifically that ‘a partial disorganization of the body schema 
and corporeal space can have an effect on gnosis’ (p. 147).21 Due to an 
unnatural position of the hands and fingers in the experiment, the visual 
body is no more accessible to the subject as the starting point for an 
 
21 Merleau-Ponty builds on Schilder (1935, pp. 23–24, 52–56). 
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action, even though it remains accessible for it as tactile (even based on 
verbal command, phasis; p. 150). This dissociation leads Merleau-Ponty 
to conclude that the experimental position produces an alienated, 
dissociated, external body, a body-object, and shows how ‘human praxis 
sediments in vision’ (pp. 148–149). 
As it is evident, Merleau-Ponty interprets visual perception of 
one’s body as a part of the body schema, not just as a body image which 
would be distinct from it. In the case of the Japanese illusion, a 
disorientation on the visual level results in a temporary disorganization of 
the body-schematic diacritical system, that is, a perceptual figure 
disintegrates the body-schematic ground. As both Schilder and Merleau-
Ponty point out, the disorienting effect of the visual figure can be 
overcome by repeated attempts to mobilize appropriate parts of the body, 
that is, by gradually readjusting the body-schematic ground to the unusual 
figure.22 This means, inversely, that in normal conditions, my (external) 
perception of my own, and even other people’s, body is mapped onto my 
body’s (internal) pragmatic-motor possibilities and ‘speaks to’ them, as 
Merleau-Ponty himself writes (2011, pp. 130, 150; cf. Kristensen, 2019, 
p. 33). However, this mapping of a body image onto the body schema is 
only one particular implication of Merleau-Ponty’s general account of the 
figure-ground relationship as constituting one system, as I have already 
described them above. From a Merleau-Pontyan perspective, the body-
schematic ground of perception opens a field for some figures to appear 
 
22 Cf. the analogical case of the so-called Aristotle’s illusion, which Merleau-Ponty 
explicitly describes as ‘a disturbance of the body schema’ (2012, pp. 211–212). See 
Morris (2004, pp. 39–40) for a detailed discussion on the illusion and how it can be 
overcome. 
in it, but one’s ‘body image’ systematically maps itself on the body 
schema because all perceived, or even linguistically articulated, figures 
call for an accommodation of the body-schematic background. 
By consequence, the ‘construction of a visual body schema’ 
(schéma corporel visuel) can ‘compensate for’ or ‘mask’ a deficiency of a 
more vital order, such as a disorder of the labyrinth (Merleau-Ponty 2011, 
pp. 158, 148).23 Similarly, Schneider is able to recognize an ‘abstract’ 
movement when it is happening, even though he is not able to carry it out 
spontaneously (cf. Merleau-Ponty, 2012, pp. 112–113). These cases of 
dissociation of gnosic body (target of vision or pointing) from praxic 
body (the starting point or ‘ground’ for action) attest the possibility for a 
‘stocking of practical intentionality’ (stockage de l’intentionnalité 
pratique) or a ‘cumulative history’ of praxis (2011, p. 199). This means 
that ‘the results acquired on one level remain acquired even if the same 
function is disintegrated on other levels’ (p. 157). Using a Husserlian 
terminology, Merleau-Ponty also repeatedly contends that the system of 
gnosic superstructures should be understood as a sedimentation of praxic 
infrastructures.24 By sedimenting, the figure-ground diacritical system of 
perception becomes a system of differentiation based on ‘traces of human 
praxis’ (trace, tracé, p. 156). Correspondingly, Merleau-Ponty dedicates a 
large part of the 1953 course to the study of such traces on both 
perceptual and cultural levels, and to the way in which they ‘express’ and 
‘call for’ a specific act of a body-schematic taking up (cf., in particular, 
 
23 In my understanding, this would also apply to Ian Waterman’s case described by 
Gallagher & Cole (1995). 
24 See Merleau-Ponty (2011, pp. 148, 151, 157, 201; cf. also the terms acquis and 
acquisition: pp. 141, 157, 161). 
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2011, pp. 70–126, 165–170). For Merleau-Ponty, a visual ‘trace’ is an 
‘inscription’ of a temporal movement into a spatial figure, and therefore 
‘a beginning of sedimentation’ (p. 189; cf. pp. 113, 119). 
Merleau-Ponty also claims that the sedimentation eventually 
culminates in the creation of linguistic signs, which are ‘arbitrary’ or 
‘conventional’ (Saussure) and thus guarantee a ‘radical transcendence of 
the signified with regard to the signifier’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2011, p. 162). 
The conventional character of signs accomplishes the process of 
dissociation of meaning from its praxic context and creates what Merleau-
Ponty calls an ‘intelligence institutionalized in language’ (pp. 157–158; 
cf. 1968b, pp. 38–39). The question of language, however, is intentionally 
excluded from the 1953 lecture as Merleau-Ponty believes that the 
linguistic type of sedimentation requires a dedicated inquiry (cf. 2011, p. 
66). Merleau-Ponty addresses language in his other works from the same 
period (e.g., 1973; 1964b; 2000), in the course from the following year 
(1954), and beyond. 
In the 1953 lecture, Merleau-Ponty therefore clarifies that all of 
our relationships to objects constitute one system, even though this system 
is stratified into different levels of figure-ground dynamics. This is 
evident on the fact that the disruptions of this system manifest themselves 
predominantly on its gnosic (visual-symbolic) or praxic (corporeal) 
pole—apraxia and agnosia are ‘relatively independent’, even though there 
is often a ‘predominance’ of one type of disorder.25 
 
25 See Merleau-Ponty (2011, pp. 146, 157); referring to de Ajuriaguerra & Hécean 
(1952). 
However, cases of constructive apraxia show more precisely that 
there can be a gnosic difficulty rooted in the impossibility for the subject 
to ‘motorically take up’ (reprise motrice) the perception of a figure or 
trace ‘as incarnating a motor project’ or as its equivalent (2011, p. 156; cf. 
2012, p. 142). Similarly, on Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Schilder, every 
agnosia involves an incapacity to manipulate with some aspects of the 
structure of the object and, inversely, every apraxia ‘erases a layer of 
signification’ from our knowledge (connaissance) of the object or at least 
from its practical presence for us (2011, p. 157). Thus, in general, we 
need to conceive of gnosis as a second-level praxis or as its sublimation, a 
mobility of another level, because gnosic recognition and praxic 
manipulation are intermingled and ‘any impairment at one level has 
repercussions at other levels’ (p. 158). Following the idea of de 
Ajuriaguerra and Hécean (1949), Merleau-Ponty ultimately decides to 
conceive of praxis and gnosis (and phasis) not as distinct faculties, but as 
‘poles’ or ‘levels’ of ‘one fundamental activity’ or function, which is our 
mobility or praxis (2011, pp. 145, 157; original emphasis).26 
Thus, on the one hand, Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that since 
gnosic superstructures can compensate for a disintegration on the level of 
praxic infrastructures,27 the former ‘acquire a relative independence’ from 
the latter (2011, p. 148). On the other hand, however, he points out that 
this independence ‘is not absolute’ (p. 148), and if the infrastructure is 
‘weakened’ in some way, the superstructure is negatively affected by this 
fact in the long run (p. 151). 
 
26 Cf. also Merleau-Ponty (2011, pp. 154, 158; 2012, pp. 119, 121, 139). 
27 See Merleau-Ponty (2011, pp. 148, 157–158, 202; cf., for example, 2012, p. 139). 
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In order to illustrate this point, Merleau-Ponty returns once more 
to the case of Schneider, who uses his ‘external verbal knowledge’ (2011, 
p. 157) to mask his praxic deficiencies. The possibility of such a 
compensation shows that ‘language is a symbolism that succeeds in 
masking its own ruins’ (p. 202). However, the superstructures of language 
and knowledge have ‘lost their productivity’ in Schneider’s case (p. 148) 
and therefore have become ‘fundamentally different’ from what they are 
in normal subjects (p. 157). They became a mere mask of the praxic 
deficiencies rather than fully replacing their function (p. 148; also see 
above: Ersatzleistung). Schneider was still able to use language and had 
conserved arithmetical skills to a certain degree, but he had problems to 
understand analogy, formulate new metaphors, act spontaneously, or 
improvise in speech. In short, ‘the “life” of language is altered’ in him 
(2012, p. 201; cf. pp. 129–130); the integrity of language ‘is only 
apparent’ in his case (2011, p. 157). 
In sum, Merleau-Ponty maintains that a full integrity of gnosic 
superstructures presupposes the integrity of the ‘power of construction’, 
and thereby the integrity of praxic infrastructures (2011, pp. 148, 157). 
The sedimentation only remains ‘alive’ (vivante) as a ground for some 
meaningful figures if our body-schematic capacity for diacritical activity 
continues to support it and carry it further. Thus, even on the gnosic level, 
the incarnation ‘may be reduced, but not eliminated’ (p. 201)—if the 
gnosic superstructure is to conserve its integrity and its full sense, it must 
remain connected to the praxic infrastructure of the structuring activity of 
the body schema. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
According to Merleau-Ponty, perception is correlative to mobility and 
thus to the body schema as the ‘register’ in which the motor possibilities 
are continually inscribed and from which they radiate into the 
environment. Correspondingly, we are usually not aware of the body 
schema, because it is not one of the experiential contents of the world, but 
rather a standard or a Gestalt-psychological ‘norm’ of our relation to the 
world. 
Correspondingly, all perceptions, including those which we have 
of our own body (body image percept), are figures-on-a-ground. As 
figures-on-a-ground, perceptions are not merely our intentional counter-
poles, but provisorily acquired norms in reference to which the body-
schematic operational intentionality continues its diacritical activity. 
Figures are not simply representations, but affordances and way-points 
for our exploration. This is how a body image percept can both 
compensate for a lack on the level of the body schema and inversely 
hinder its activity—visual perception of one’s body is not only a result of 
body-schematic activity, but also a provisorily established referential 
norm with regard to which such activity continues to evolve. As it is 
evident, a fundamental implication of Merleau-Ponty’s decision to 
include the ‘ground’ of the figure-ground structure into the phenomenal 
domain is that it informs us about how the body image percept co-
organizes the body schema. 
However, Merleau-Ponty tells us much more than that. The 
mobility rooted in our provisorily acquired norms inaugurates what 
Merleau-Ponty calls ‘a dialectics of expression’ through which the 
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mobility is ‘transformed into expression’ (2011, pp. 151, 158, 164). The 
‘expressive’ gesture of pointing, for example, is still of the perceptual 
order; it is a refinement, a more specific differentiation of the perceptual 
structure itself, and thus the ‘assumption’ of the full sense of the 
perceived (assomption, p. 65). Gesture is thus not a representational act 
relying on an ‘abstract’ attitude (cf. 2012, pp. 122–123), but a diacritical 
superstructure refining our perceptual norms. It is a figure that 
accommodates articulations that would remain in the (back)ground in a 
merely receptive attitude. As such, a gesture is a superstructure of the 
body schema. In this way, Merleau-Ponty outlines a description of a 
process through which the body-schematic praxis sediments in perceptual 
superstructures or ‘expressions’, which appeal to our body schema and 
require to be ‘taken up’ (reprise) on ‘higher levels’ of praxis such as co-
perception and gestural communication. 
Perceptual norms are therefore not only incessantly renewed 
through movement; they are also more specifically structured by 
diacritical norms of superior orders, progressively more ‘sedimented’ 
diacritical systems such as visual figures, gestures, and, ultimately, 
language. Body-schematic operative intentionality (praxis) thus not only 
serves as an infrastructure for the consciousness of various types of 
explicit intentional correlates (gnosis), but also ‘incorporates’ them in 
itself and is modified by them (cf. 2011, pp. 141, 151, 158). Thus, even 
though Merleau-Ponty maintains that our mobility is originary with 
respect to meaning, his philosophy is not an anti-intellectualism. 
Perception founded in mobility does not exclude quasi-representational 
experiences of sedimented meanings as we observe them in vision or 
linguistic articulation. On the contrary, body-schematic activity is co-
organized by perceptual figures, including our body image percepts, and 
eventually cultural diacritical systems that include body image concepts. 
These are the grounds that Merleau-Ponty builds on when he occasionally 
speaks of an ‘institutional or cultural element of all perception’ (p. 177) 
and claims that perception is ‘informed’ or ‘fashioned by culture’ (1968a, 
p. 212). 
Beyond that, we have also seen that although the gnosic 
superstructures become relatively independent of praxic mobility and 
impose their sedimented structures on it, they also necessarily involve 
some type of praxis or activity. Disconnected from a subject capable of 
the ‘higher level praxis’ of speech, language is reduced to a mere ‘mask’ 
or ‘ruin’ of language; it is ‘petrified’ and ‘emptied of its meaning’ (2011, 
p. 201; 1970, pp. 119–120). The diacritical symbolic system of language 
needs to be taken up in speech, which is the agent of a supra-perceptual 
body-schematic praxis—a superstructure of the body schema. Taking into 
account how various body images both stem from a body-schematic 
context and acquire a relative independence on it, Merleau-Ponty 
provides an account of experience that maintains a priority of operative 
intentionality on all of its levels. 
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